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CASENOTES
Section 10(b)-All That Is Unfair Is Not Fraud: Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green'—The phenomenon of "going private," whereby the majority
stockholders of a publicly held corporation return the company to private
ownership by eliminating the minority public stockholders from their
equity position in the corporation, 2 has engendered a large body of legal
commentary. 3 Some observers suggest that a corporation's expulsion of its
minority stockholders may be an abuse of the controlling . stockholders'
power, resulting in the unwarranted oppression of the minority stockhold-
ers.' Additionally, it has been noted that the bearish stock market of re-
cent years provides a strong incentive for companies to go private, since the
majority stockholders are able to repurchase the corporation's stock at
prices reflecting the depressed market conditions. 5 As a result, the minority
public stockholders may receive less than their ir,itial investment for their
shares. 6
Minority stockholders, faced with being frozen out of a corporation
contemplating going private, often seek to challenge the validity of the
transaction under state law.' Such challenges have also been instituted
' 430 U.S. 462 (1977),
2 Moore, Going Private: Techniques and Problems of Eliminating the Public. Stockholder, I J.
CORP. L. 321, 321-22 (1976). There are five basic techniques which may be used alone or in
combination with one another to effectuate a going private transaction: (a) the repurchase of
shares other than through cash tender offers; (b) cash tender offers; (c) exchange offers; (d)
reorganization through cash-out merger or sale of assets; and (e) a reverse stock split. Id, at
323.
Going private transactions have also been selected by the SEC for regulation under
proixised rule I3e-3, which, if enacted, will govern going private transactions by certain
issuers through requirements of disclosure and overall fairness. 2 FED. SEC. L. Rat', (CCH)
1,1 23,703A, 23,706. For a discussion of the proposed rule 13e-3 see Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 14185, [Current] FED. SEC, L. Rap. (CCH) 1 81,366. The resulting ef'f'ects of going
private which will bring the transaction under proposed rule I3e-3 include: the delisting of a
class of equity securities from a national securities exchange; termination of registration under
§ 12(g)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act; eligibility for suspension of an issuer's reporting ob-
ligations under § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act; and cessation of authorization for quo-
tation of a class of equity securities on an inter-dealer system. Id. at 17,245-4.
3 See, e.g., F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" Or rVIINORITV SIIAREIICH.DERS, EXPULSION OR OP.
PRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES (1975); Borden, Going Private — Old Tort, New Tort or No
Tort!, 49 N.Y.C. L. Ray. 987 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Borden]; Brudney, A Note on "Going
Private", 61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Brudney]; Brudney & Chirelstein,
Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV, L. REV, 297 (1974); O'Neal & Janke,
Utilizing Rule 10b-5 for Remedying Squeeze-Outs or Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 16 B.C. 1ND.
& Cont. L. REV. 327 (1975) [hereinafter cited as O'Neal & Janke]; Note, Going Private, 84 YAI.E
L. J. 903 (1975) thereinafter cited as YALE Note].
Several commentators, while expressing general concern with the overall phenomenon
of going private, argue that different standards should be developed to govern the various
corporate contexts in which going private transactions occur. The three most common situ-
ations are: (1) a closely held corporation merging with a shell corporation to eliminate particu-
lar stockholders; (2) a parent corporation eliminating public stockholders of a subsidiary; and
(3) a public corporation returning itself to private status. Borden, supra, at 1040-42. See also
Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487, 508-14 (1976).
O'Neil & Janke, supra note 3, at 327-28; YALE Note, supra note 3, at 905-06.
Borden, supra note 3, at 987-89; YALE note, supra note 3, at 903.
Brudney, supra note 3, at 1019.
E.g., Bryan v, Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 569-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S, 844 (1974) (challenge to short-form merger on ground that merger was fraudulent de-
vice to eliminate plaintiff upheld); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1977) (claim of breach of fiduciary duty in long-form merger upheld); 'Panzer v. International
Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1977) (challenge to long-form merger
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under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' and rule
10b-59
 promulgated thereunder.'° Section 10(b) is the general anti-fraud
provision of the Act which proscribes manipulative and deceptive acts or
practices in connection with a securities transaction. In going private trans-
actions, a critical factor in terms of potential section 10(b) liability is the fact
that the majority stockholders may not have engaged in such fraudulent
acts as nondisclosure or misrepresentation. The minority stockholders in
such situations must therefore attempt to recover under section 10(b) on
claims of breach of fiduciary duty and on the inherent unfairness of being
forcibly foreclosed from maintaining ownership of their stock. Thus, such a
section 10(b) action raises the threshold question whether a claim under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 can be maintained absent allegations that the
on claim of breach of fiduciary duty upheld; cashed-out stockholders entitled to hearing on
fairness of merger terms); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 10-11, 187 A.2d
78, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (challenge to short-form merger on claim of breach of fiduciary duty
unsuccessful because appraisal remedy is exclusive in the absence of actual fraud); Kemp v.
Angel, 381 A.2d 241, 245 (Del. Ch. 1977) (recognition of claim of breach of fiduciary duty in
Singer extended to short-form merger; preliminary injunction granted and trial on issue of
overall fairness ordered); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2(1 120, 124-25, 371
N.Y.S.2d 550, 554 (Sup. Ct.), affd per curiam, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975)
(injunction granted against long-form merger under state securities statute).
8
 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The statute reads in full:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange —
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security reg-
istered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
17 C.F.R. § 240.101)-5 (1977). The rule reads as follows:
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices.
It shall he unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security.
'° E.g., Marshel v. AFW Fabrics Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1278 (2d Cir.), vacated and re-
manded for a determination of mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976) (claim seeking injunction against
long-form merger upheld under § 10(b)); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d
Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (complaint challenging short-form merger as fraudulent
act violating § 10(b) in absence of showing of justifiable corporate purpose upheld); Kauffman
v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 17 (S.D,N.Y. 1974), affd per curiam, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975)
(claim for injunctive relief against long-form merger denied in absence of allegations of non-
disclosure or misrepresentation); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp.
369, 373, 375 (D. Del. 1965) (short-form merger violates § 10(b) when value of stock is mis-
represented to minority stockholders); Dreir v. Music Makers Group, Inc., (1973-74 Transfer
Binder) FED: SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,406, at 95,410 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (merger cannot be chal-
lenged under § 10(b) on ground of unfairness alone).
Id.
Id.
940 .
CR SENOTES
defendant engaged in manipulative or'deceptive conduct involving nondis
closure or misrepresentation.
In its 1977 Term, the Supreme Court, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, "considered for the first time whether a challenge to a procedurally
correct short-form merger 12 can be maintained under section 10(b) on a
theory of breach of fiduciary duty absent allegations of nondisclosure or
misrepresentation. The Court held that such a claim is not cognizable
under section 10(b) since allegations of nondisClosure or misrepresentation
are necessary elements of a section 10(b) claim," and that in their absence,
section 10(b) is unconcerned with questions of overall fairness." The deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the .Second Circuit in Santa Fe, holding
that a complaint alleging breach of fidUciary duty by a majority stockholder
is cognizable under section 10(b) in the absence of nondisclosure or mis-
representation, 15
 was thus totally rejected by the Supreme Court. In so
holding, the Supreme Court determined that, as between section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act and state statutory and fiduciary duty law,
state law provides the proper forum fUr resolving issues of overall fairness
to minority stockholders raised by the going private phenomenon.
The Santa Fe decision marks an, important step in interpreting the
scope of section 10(b). The Court's ruling that only those complaints alleg-
ing manipulation or deception are cognizable under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 precludes expansion of section 10(b) liability and will therefore sig-
nificantly affect future federal regulation of corporate affairs under section
10(b)." This casenote will examine the correctness of the narrow view of
the scope of section 10(b) adopted by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe as
compared with the broad view advanced by the Second Circuit in its deci-
sion in Santa Fe. For the purpose of this analysis, the facts of the Santa Fe
case and the opinions of the courts will first be explicated. The rationale of
the Supreme Court's narrow view of section 10(b) which limits the scope of
" 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
" A short-form' merger differs from a long-form merger in that a short-form merger is
effectuated solely by resolution of the boards of directors of the merging corporations whereas
shareholder approval is required in a long-form merger. Under the Delaware merger statute a
short-form merger may be effectuated only when one of the merging corporations controls at
least 90% of the mock of the other. DEL. Cone tit. 8, § 253(a) (1975). In all other cases, the
long-form merger procedure must be followed.I DEL. CODE tit. 8, §§ 251, 252 (1975). See N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW § 905 (McKinney 1977) (short-form merger requires ownership of 95% of the
other corporation's stock).
3
 430 U.S. at 474.
14 1d. at 476.
" Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1291 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S.
462 (1977).
" The Supreme Court heard two private actions under § 10(b) between 1975 and 1977,
and in each case read § 10(b) narrowly. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975), the Court denied standing under rule 10b-5 to a non-purchasing, or non-selling
plaintiff, and affirmed the rule laid down in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461,
463-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 956 (1952), that only actual purchasers and sellers of se-
curities have standing to sue under the rule. 421 U.S. at 731, 754-55. In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court addressed the question whether a claim
under § 10(b) and rule 10h-5 may be stated on :a theory of negligent nonfeasance or whether
scienter must be alleged. Resolving the conflict among the circuits, the Court held that scienter
is an essential element of a claim under rule 10b-5. Id. at 193 & n.12, 214. For a discussion of
the restrictive posture of the Court in this area and with respect to other provisions of the
federal securities statutes, see Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L. Rev. 891 (1977).
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that section to complaints alleging manipulation or deception will be
examined. Having discussed the narrow view of section 10(b) adopted by
the Supreme Court, this casenote will examine the broad view adopted by
the Second Circuit in its decision in Santa Fe, under which section 10(b) is
_read expansively to encompass complaints alleging breach of fiduciary duty
and unfairness in securities transactions. The issue raised in Santa Fe re-
garding the propriety of judicially creating federal fiduciary standards of
fairness under section 10(b) will then be examined with reference to the
two views of section 10(b). The rationale proffered by the Second Circuit
for recognizing federal fiduciary duties in the context of short-form mer-
gers will be discussed and contrasted with the Supreme Court's refusal to
utilize section 10(b) to redress claims of unfairness. It will be submitted that
the Santa Fe Court properly refused to read section 10(b) as encompassing
claims of unfairness and breach of fiduciary duty not perpetrated by man-
ipulation or deception.
I. THE SANTA FE DECISION
The short-form merger challenged in Santa Fe was undertaken by
Santa Fe Industries, Inc., a Delaware corporation, to obtain one hundred
percent ownership of Kirby Lumber, a company in which Santa Fe con-
trolled ninety-five percent of the stock." The merger was effectuated pur-
suant to section 253 of the Delaware General Corporation Laws." This Del-
aware statute provides that a parent corporation which controls at least
ninety percent of the stock of a subsidiary may, upon resolution of the par-
ent's board of directors, merge that subsidiary with the parent corporation
and make cash payments for the shares of the minority stockholders." Sig-
nificantly, the statute does not require that the merger be undertaken to
serve a justifiable corporate purpose. 2° The board of directors of the par-
" 430 U.S. at 465. Kirby was controlled by Santa Fe through a wholly owned subsidiary,
Santa Fe Natural Resources, Inc., which owned the Kirby stock. Id. at 465 n.2.
" Id. at 465. DEL. Cont: tit. 8, § 253(a) (1975) provides in relevant part:
In any case in which at least 90% of the outstanding shares of each class of
the stock of a corporation ... is owned by another corporation the corpora-
tion having such stock ownership may either merge the other corporation . . .
into itself and assume all of its or their obligations, or merge itself .. . into ..
the other corporations by executing, acknowledging and filing ... a certificate of
such ownership and merger setting forth a copy of the resolution of its board of
directors to so merge and the date of the adoption; provided, however, that in
case the parent corporation shall not own all of the outstanding stock of all the
subsidiary corporations, parties to a merger as aforesaid, the resolution of the
board of directors of the parent corporation shall state the terms and conditions
of the -merger, including the securities,. cash, property, or rights to be issued,
paid, delivered, or granted by the surviving corporation upon surrender of each
share of the subsidiary corporation ....
Thirty-seven other states have short-form merger statutes comparable to Delaware's. Green v.
Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1299 (2d Cir. 1976) (Moore, J., dissenting), rev'd, 430
U.S. 462 (1977).
19
 DEL. Co M: tit. 8, § 253(a) (1975).
2° Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 430 U.S: 462, 479 n.16 (1977). See also Stauffer v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 10.11, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (purpose of stat-
ute is to provide corporate majority with means for the elimination of the minority). Sub-
sequent to Santa Fe, the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that for a short-form merger to be
valid, it must be shown to be fair to the minority stockholders. Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241,
245 (Del. Ch. 1977).
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ent corporation is empowered under the statute to initiate the merger
without shareholder approval and without previously notifying them of its
action." Section 262 of the Delaware statute grants frozen out minority
stockholders who are dissatisfied with the offering price of the merger the
right to have the value of their shares appraised in the Court of Chan-
cery."
Santa Fe, Kirby's parent corporation, effectuated the Kirby merger
through use of a dummy corporation." The board of directors of the
dummy corporation voted to merge with Kirby and offer $150 per share to
Kirby's minority stockholders." The minority stockholders were notified of
the merger the next day, and were sent an information statement which
fully disclosed the financial status of Kirby and reported the process by
which the stock had been valued." Under Delaware law, the minority
stockholders' only alternatives were either to accept the majority's offer, or
to reject it and seek appraisal of their stock's value in the Court of Chan-
cery."
Plaintiff Green rejected Santa Fe's offer and decided not to pursue his
appraisal rights under Delaware law." Instead, Green brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against
Santa Fe, derivatively on behalf of Kirby", and as a class action on behalf
of the minority stockholders of Kirby." The plaintiffs sought to have the
merger set aside, or alternatively, to recover the fair value of their stock. 3 °
The plaintiffs alleged that the merger scheme violated section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 106-5, on the ground that the
merger and the proffered cash exchange constituted a "device, scheme or
artifice to defraud" carried out solely to benefit the majority stockholders at
21 Diu.. CODE tit. 8, § 253(a)-(d) (1975). Notice of the merger must be sent to the stock-
holders within ten days of the effective date of the merger. Id. at § 253(d). Santa Fe sent
notice the day after the merger was consummated, which notice alerted the stockholders to
their appraisal rights. 430 U.S. at 466. Santa Fe fully complied with the requirements of § 253
in accomplishing the merger. Id.
" DEL. Com: tit. 8, § 262 (1975). The statute itself is silent on the exclusivity of the ap-
praisal remedy but it had been held to be exclusive, subject only to the power of equity to deal
with illegality and fraud. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch 7, 9-10, 187 A.2d 78,
80 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
430 U.S. at 466 n.3.
24 Id. at 466. Prior to the merger Santa Fe obtained independent appraisals of Kirby's
physical assets and its oil and gas interests. The asset appraisals were submitted to Morgan
Stanley & Co. for an appraisal of the value of Kirby stock. Morgan Stanley concluded that the
stock had a fair market value of $125 per share. Id.
'5 Id.
28 See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 10-11, 187 A.2d 78. 80 (Sup. Ct.
1962); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967).
22 The plaintiffs filed for an appraisal in the court of chancery, but later withdrew the
petition. 430 U.S. at 466-67 & n.4.
28 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 850-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 533
F.2d 1283 (2(1 Cir. 1976), rey'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Jurisdiction was based on § 27 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), which creates exclusive jurisdiction in
the federal district courts for all suits arising under the provisions of the Act or the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder. Pendant jurisdiction over state law claims of breach of
fiduciary duty was also claimed. 391 F. Supp. at 851.
3° 391 F. Supp. at 850-51.
30 430 U.S. at 467.
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the minority's expense without any justifiable corporate purpose and with-
out prior notice to the minority stockholders. 31 Thus, the plaintiffs con-
tended that the merger was a fraudulent act violating section 10(b), despite
the fact that Santa Fe had complied with the notice requirements of the
Delaware merger statute and had disclosed all material information in the
information statement. 32 The complaint set forth as an additional claim an
allegation that the stock was grossly undervalued by Santa Fe, and that this
undervaluation itself constituted actionable fraud under rule 10b-5. 33
Santa Fe filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, which mo-
tion the district court granted. 34 In so doing, the court stated that section
10(b) neither modifies the notice requirements of the Delaware merger
statute nor imposes an independent requirement that a justifiable corporate
purpose be served for a short-form merger to be valid." The court con-
cluded that a complaint challenging a procedurally correct short-form
merger is not cognizable under section 10(b) if defendants have made a full
and fair disclosure of the material facts." Since it was conceded that Santa
Fe had fully complied with the notice requirements of the Delaware statute,
and since the court found that Santa Fe had not misrepresented the value
of Kirby's assets, the court held that the complaint failed to state a claim
under rule 10b-5. 37 The court further held that offering an inadequate
price for the minority's stock in a going private transaction does not alone
a' 391 F. Supp. at 852.
' 2 Id. at 853-54.
" Id. at 852. The plaintiffs claimed that the Kirby stock had a value of at least $772 per
share. This figure reflected the liquidation value of Kirby's assets, and was accepted as true by
the district court for the purposes of Santa Fe's motion to dismiss. However, the court noted
that liquidation value is generally not determinative in an appraisal of fair market value. Id. at
853. The plaintiffs also contended that Santa Fe's offering price was raised $25 over that rec-
ommended by Morgan Stanley as part of a scheme to lull the minority stockholders into ac-
cepting the offer in the belief that Santa Fe was generous. Id. at 852.
Morgan Stanley was also a named defendant. The complaint alleged that Morgan Stan-
ley knowingly participated in the fraudulent undervaluation of the Kirby stock, Id. The com-
plaint against Morgan Stanley was dismissed by the district court, which dismissal was affirmed
on appeal. 391 F. Supp. 849, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), retid on other grounds, 533 F.2d 1283,
1293-94 (2d Cir. 1976).
21
 391 F. Supp. at 856.
"Id. at 853. The court viewed § 10(b) as a disclosure provision, the objective of which is
to be achieved in conjunction with state law. Id. The court also relied on rules promulgated by
the SEC to regulate going private transactions as indicative of the SEC's conclusion that rule
10b-5 did not reach the acts complained of in Santa Pe. Id. at 854-55. The proposed • rules
would have required a valid business purpose for the merger and disclosure prior to the effec-
tuation of the transaction. See Proposed Rules 13e-3A and 13e-3B, 2 FED. SEC, L. REP. (CCH)
1 23,704-05; Securities Act. Release No. 5567, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] Fr.n. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 80,104. The SEC has recently proposed an additional rule, rule 13e-3, to regulate
going private transactions. This rule would maintain the disclosure requirements, but would
replace the requirement of a valid business purpose with one of overall fairness. Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 14185, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,366; 2 FED. SEC. L. Rap.
(CCH) 1;1 23,703A, 23,706.
" 391 F. Supp. at 854.
31 Id, at 853-54. The court also ruled that even if the information statement did not
constitute Rill disclosure, the complaint failed to allege causation between the alleged decep-
tion and the plaintiffs' injury since Santa Fe's offering price was not accepted by the plaintiffs.
Id. at 855.
994
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constitute bad faith or overreaching by the majority and therefore is not it-
self a violation of section 10(b). 38
Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit." A divided court reversed the
district court's dismissa1,44 holding that a cause of action under section
10(b) is stated when a complaint alleges that the majority stockholders
breached their fiduciary duty by effecting a short-form merger for no justi-
fiable business purpose.'" The Second Circuit also concluded that allega-
tions of nondisclosure or misrepresentation are not necessary to state a
claim under rule 10b-5. 42 The court based its conclusion that allegations of
nondisclosure or misrepresentation are not essential elements of a claim
under rule 10b-5 both on the long history of cases under section 10(b) rely-
ing on allegations of breach of fiduciary duty," and on the need to read
section 10(b) broadly to effectuate its purpose of protecting investors from
injuries suffered in securities transactions."
The Second Circuit considered a broad reading of section 10(b)
necessary since going private transactions involve a large potential for
abuse of the majority stockholders' control of the corporation with con-
comitant injury to the minority stockholders. 45 In particular, the court
pointed out that the Delaware short-form merger statute permits the
majority stockholders to determine unilaterally the timing and the terms of
the merger. 4 6 Further, the court emphasized that the majority stock-
holders may act without giving prior notice of the merger to the minority
stockholders, thereby precluding the possibility that minority shareholders
could seek pre-merger relief.'" The Second Circuit concluded that full dis-
38 Id. at 854. The court concluded that the complaint revealed only that the parties dis-
agreed on the fair market value of the stock, and that since the relevant facts giving rise to the
dispute were fully revealed, § 10(h) was inapplicable. Id. The plaintiffs conceded on oral ar-
gument before the court that if the difference between the offering price and true value were
so slight that reasonable minds could differ, the:complaint would fail. Id. at 853 n.l.
'" 533 F.2d 1283, 1285 (2d Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 1294. judge Moore dissented on the grounds that the court had unjustifiably
utilized § 10(b) to override valid state law and to find fraud in the effectuation of a legitimate
corporate transaction. Id. at 1299-1309.
41 1d. at 1291. The exact nature of the business purpose test was not discussed by the
court. Nor did the court reach the claim that gross undervaluation of the stock alone states a
claim under rule 101)-5. /d.
42 Id. at 1287. For text of rule 10-5 see note 9 supra.
13 1d. at 1287, 1289-91. The court relied heavily on its decision in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), where it
held that a violation of rule 10b-5 was stated when plaintiffs alleged that the controlling stock-
holder had engaged in improper self-dealing and breach of fiduciary duly in the absence of
nondisclosure or misrepresentation. Id. at 219-20,
' 4 533 F.2d at .1290, See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 0,
12 (1971) ("[sjection 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively"). Sec also Af-
filiated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
" 533 F.2d at 1287.
48 Id. at 1289. The court considered the majority's power to effectuate a short-form
merger on its own terms potentially injurious to the minority stockholders since the majority
are likely to effect the merger at a time when the stock's value is particularly low. Further, the
majority may offer an inadequate price for the stock which, if accepted by the minority, would
result in an unwarranted benefit to the majority. Id.
" Id. at 1291. Although the Second Circuit considered the unavailability of pre-merger
relief to he particularly significant, it was not essential to the recognition of a § 10(b) claim.
Indeed, five days before its decision in Santa Fe the Second Circuit had upheld a claim for a
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closure is not "the crucial inquiry" in the context of a short-form merger
because post-merger disclosure of financial information does nothing to
mitigate the fraudulent act of merging for no justifiable corporate pur-
pose.48
Defendant Santa Fe petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,
which the Court granted." The court reversed the Second Circuit, 5° and in
a 6-2-1 decision," held that section 10(b) proscribes only manipulative and
deceptive conduct," and thus, that a complaint alleging only a breach of a
majority stockholders' fiduciary duty, absent allegations of nondisclosure or
misrepresentation, does not state a cause of action under section 10(b). 53
Writing for the majority, Justice White maintained that the determi-
nation of the proper scope of section 10(b) turned solely upon the Ian-
guage54
 and upon the legislative history of that section. 55
 In so doing, he
seemingly rejected the broad, remedial view of section 10(b) adopted by the
Second Circuit." Instead, Justice White concluded that the language of sec-
tion 10(b) gives "no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct
not involving manipulation or deception." 57
 Similarly, the legislative history
of section 10(b), in Justice White's view, gives no indication that Congress
intended section 10(b) to reach any conduct not involving manipulation or
deception. 58
 Justice White therefore concluded that only claims alleging
manipulative or deceptive conduct are cognizable under section 10(b). 59
After concluding that section 10(b) requires an allegation of either de-
ception or manipulation, the Court next considered whether the plaintiffs'
complaint set forth a claim that Santa Fe's short-form merger involved de-
preliminary injunction against a proposed long-form merger in a case where pre-merger relief
under state law was obtainable. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1278, vacated
and remanded for a determination of mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976).
" 533 F.2d at 1292. In Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1974), the court denied
a claim'for a preliminary injunction against a long-form merger in the absence of allegations
of nondisclosure or misrepresentation, holding that once full disclosure is insured, § 10(b) is
unconcerned with questions of fairness. Id. at 720. Popkin was distinguished in Santa Fe on its
facts since the merger. in Popkin was being undertaken to serve a compelling corporate pur-
pose. Id. at 1291. The court recognized, however, that its decision in Popkin could be criticized
because it failed to take into account the fact that full disclosure in the Popkin situation was in-
effective to the extent that the minority stockholders were powerless to affect the outcome of
the stockholder vote. Id.
"429 U.S. 814 (1976).
55
 430 U.S. 462, 471 (1977).
"Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred in part in the judgment of the Court. Jus-
tice Brennan dissented. 430 U.S. at 480.
52
 430 U.S. at 473-74.
53 Id, at 476-77.
54 Id. at 472, quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976), quoting Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). The
Court stated that the scope of rule 10b-5 can be no broader than the scope of § 10(b). Id. at
472-73. The Court also noted that the absence of the SEC in the case as amicus curiae in sup-
port of' the plaintiffs' claim made it particularly important to adhere to the language of the
statute. Id. at 473 n.12. The SEC had appeared as amicus curiae for the plaintiffs in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975). However, in both cases the Court rejected the interpretation of § 10(b) urged
by the Commission. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197-99;. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 743, 754-55.
55
 430 U.S„ at 473.
"See 430 U.S. at 471-72, 474-76.
55 1d. at 473.
as Id.
' 5 1d. at 473-74.
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ception violating section 10(b). Under the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, the
Court found no basis for such a claim." Determining that full disclosure of
material facts is the antithesis of deception," the majority noted that the
plaintiffs did not contend that the information statement provided to the
minority stockholders contained any omissions or misrepresentations."
Given this fact, the majority observed that Santa Fe therefore had in no
way acted to deceive the minority stockholders as to the value of their
stock, and that on the basis of the data contained in the information state-
ment, the plaintiffs could intelligently exercise their option to "accept the
price offered or reject it and seek an appraisal in the Delaware Court of
Chancery."65
 The majority therefore determined that these factors man-
dated the conclusion that the defendants had satisfied the full disclosure
requirement of section 10(b), and thus, that the short-form merger was not
tainted with deception. 64
After reaching its conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to set forth
a claim of deception, the Court determined that the cases relied on by the
plaintiffs and the Second Circuit did not support the proposition that the
breach of a fiduciary duty without more violates section 10(b). 65 In these
cases, the Court contended, a breach of fiduciary duty was found to violate
section 10(b) because there was present an element of deception." The
Court viewed the existence of deception as the essential element of the sec-
tion 10(b) claim in each case and therefore found no support in the cases
for the Second Circuit's contention that a nondeceptive breach of fiduciary
duty violates section 10(b). 67
Bo Id.
6 Id. at 477-78. The Court apparently considered the minority stockholder's sole inter-
est in the merger to be the protection of their right to receive the fair market value of their
stock, and therefore limited its scrutiny of the Merger under § 10(b) to insuring that this right
was not impaired by nondisclosure or misrepresentation in the information statement. See 430
U.S. at 474-76, Justice Stevens expressly stated his view that the minority stockholders had no
interest in the motive for the merger under the facts in Santa Fe. 430 U.S. at 481 n.2 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
62 Id. at 474. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the lack of pre-merger
notice was a material nondisclosure since the plaintiffs had accepted the conclusion of the
lower courts that under Delaware law they could not have enjoined the merger. Thus, the
plaintiffs were unable to establish that they would have acted differently had they received
notice of the proposed merger. Id. at 474 n.14.
63 Id.. at 474.
64 Id. at 474-76.
63 Id. at 474.75 & n.15 and cases cited therein.
"The cases cited by the Court were premised on the "new fraud" theory of 10(b) lia-
bility. Under the "new fraud" theory, a complaint alleging that the majority stockholders exer-
cised a controlling influence over the corporation in a securities transaction to the detriment
of the minority stockholders is cognizable under § 10(b) in the absence of actual deception.
While several of the "new fraud" cases do contain findings that the minority stockholders were
deceived by the controlling stockholders, these specific findings of deception were tangential
to the actual holdings of the respective courts under the "new fraud" theory. See, e.g., Shell v.
Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 826-27 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 220
(2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Pappas v, Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 867,
869 (3d Cir, 1968). The "new fraud" theory itself, however, may be interpreted as consistent
with the narrow view of § 10(b) adopted by the Santa Fe Court, so that the difference between
the two theories becomes one of semantics rather than of principle. See text at notes 132-134
infra.
67
 430 U.S. at 474-76 & n.15. The Court also refused to determine the definition of
fraud under § 10(b) by reference to cases relied on by the Second Circuit defining fraud in
contexts other than the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1d. at
471 & n.11 and cases cited therein.
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The Court then turned to the question whether the short-form
merger was manipulative under the terms of section 10(b). The Court con-
cluded that the merger was not tainted with manipulation. 68 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court initially noted that the term "manipulation," as
used in securities law, is "virtually a term of art." 69 As such, the term
"manipulation" encompasses a limited array of practices, such as wash sales,
matched orders, and rigged prices," which are used to artificially affect
market activity and thereby to mislead investors as to the true value of a se-
curity. 7 ' In view of its limited definition in the securities context, the Court •
concluded that the term "manipulation" does not encompass a breach of
fiduciary duty such as that alleged in the plaintiff's complaint, the essence
of which was that the minority stockholders were treated unfairly by Santa
Fe."
Having concluded that the plaintiffs failed to set forth a cognizable
claim under the strict language of section 10(b), the majority presented
"additional considerations that weigh heavily against permitting a cause of
action under Rule 10b-5 for . . . breach of corporate fiduciary duty" absent
a concurrent allegation of deception or manipulation. 73 The first considera-
tion suggested by the Court for rejecting a section 10(b) cause of action
predicated solely upon breach of fiduciary duty was that an implied cause
of action should be recognized under rule 10b-5 only when it is necessary
to further section 10(b)'s fundamental purpose. 74 This fundamental pur-
pose, in the Court's view, is to insure full disclosure of material information
in securities transactions." Consequently, recognizing a claim under section
10(b) for breach of fiduciary duty and unfairness would be utilizing the
federal forum to redress what is, at best, a tangential concern of the stat-
ute." The second consideration suggested by the Court was that recogni-
tion of such a claim would interfere with state corporation law." The
Court noted that duties of a fiduciary have traditionally been determined
by state law." Moreover, while the Court acknowledged that federal
fiduciary standards might well be desirable to govern going private transac-
tions such as the merger in Santa Fe, it refused to create such standards ju-
dicially under section I0(b) and rule 10b-5 in the absence of express con-
gressional intent." Accordingly, the decision of the Second Circuit recog-
68 Id. at 474, 476.
66 Id. at 476, quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
70 430 U.S. at 476-77. See § 9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i
(1970). "Manipulation" also encompasses intracorporate acts which artificially affect stock
prices. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 378-81 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (manipulation of stock value as result of misappropriation of corpo-
rate assets and subsequent merger on preferential terms violates rule 10b-5); Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 242-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (manipulation of stock value by in-
tentional reduction of dividends and subsequent purchase of stock violates rule l0b-5). •
71 430 U.S. at 477.
" Id.
"
" Id.
" Id. at 477-78.
70
 Id. at 478.
" Id. at 478-79.
78 1d. at 478.
" Id. at 4 79-80. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L..). 663 (1974). Professor Cary argues that there should be a separate federal fiduciary
code and that § 10(b) should not be expanded to cover every claim of unfairness. Id. at 699-
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nizing the plaintiffs' complaint under section 10(b) was reversed by the Su-
preme Court. 8°
The differing results reached in Santa Fe by the Second Circuit"' and
Supreme Court 82 reflect two differing views of section I0(b)'s scope. Ac-
cording to the narrow view adopted by the Supreme Court, section 10(b)
encompasses only situations in which deception or manipulation are alleged
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 83 Under the alterna-
tive view adhered to by the Second Circuit, section 10(b) is deemed to have
broad, remedial purposes such that deception or manipulation are not
necessary elements in all claims brought thereunder." Each of these views
is discussed in greater detail below.
II. Two VIEWS OF THE SCOPE OF SECTION 10(b)
A. The Narrow Interpretation of 10(h)
The narrow view of section 10(b) underlying the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Santa Fe is premised on the notion that the primary purpose of
both the Securities Act of 1933 and, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
was to replace the prevailing doctrine of caveat emptor with a doctrine re-
quiring full disclosure of material information." Under this view, it is pre-
sumed that if there is full disclosure in securities transactions, all parties
will be aware of any material informations° and thus will be able to protect
their rights and interests fully." Proponents of this narrow view of section
I0(b) find support for their position in the language of section 10(b). Sec-
tion 10(b) proscribes conduct solely in terms of manipulation, deception
and fraud." Thus, the statute's language does not expressly prohibit every
tl° ,Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred in the judgment of the Court, but refused
to join the majority insofar as the "additional considerations" portion of the opinion contained
in Part IV was concerned. 430 U.S. at 480-81. Both Justices considered this portion unneces-
sary to the decision and exacerbative of the restrictive posture of the Court in interpreting
§ 10(b), a trend against which they had both previously dissented. Id. Justice Stevens further
contended that the complaint failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because the
minority stockholders were entitled to the fair market value of their stock under Delaware law
and full disclosure of all material facts had been made by Santa Fe. Id. at 481.
" 533 F.2d 1283, 1291 (2d Cir. 1976).
"2 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977).
"" M. at 473-74.
" 4 533 F.2d at 1287, 1290.
"" SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). The market
practices which prompted the enactment of the 1934 Act are detailed in the legislative history.
See S. REP. No, 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934).
"" See Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972), in which the Second Circuit,
speaking of merger transactions subject to shareholder approval under state law, said:
In the context of such transactions, if federal law ensures that shareholder
approval is fairly sought and freely given, the principal federal interest is at an
end, Underlying questions or the wisdoM of such transactions or even their fair-
ness become tangential at best of federal regulation.
Id. at 720, See also Kauffman v. Lawrence, 386 F. Stipp. 12, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), of/'d per
curium, 514 F.2c1 283 (2d Cir. 1975).
" See, e.g., 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1435 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Loss]: Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law,
55 VA. L. REV. 1103, I/19 (1969).
" For text of § 10(b) see note 8 supra.
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type of alleged unfairness which may inhere in a securities transaction.
Rather, as proponents of this narrow view contend, only those inequitable
results caused by manipulative or deceptive acts are within the scope of the
remedy provided in section 10(b) and given effect under rule 10b-5."
The operation of section 10(b) is not limited solely to transactions in
the securities market. Rather, section 10(b) serves to insure full disclosure
of material information in securities transactions effectuated wholly within
a corporation itself." This extension of section 10(b) into the corporate
boardroom is consistent with the narrow view of section 10(b) and arises
because intracorporate fraud accomplished through deception or manipula-
tion is as likely to occur and is as injurious to investors as fraud effectuated
in the securities market. Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that
intracorporate acts of deception and manipulation are proper subjects of
federal regulation under section 10(b)."
Intracorporate fraud in securities transactions often stems from the
majority stockholders' abuse of their control over the corporation, resulting
in harm both to the minority stockholders and the corporation. This con-
trol" of the corporation allows the majority stockholders to engage in
numerous securities transactions without first seeking minority stockholder
approval.93 While transactions effectuated without minority stockholder
" Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477. The Court has stated that the language of § 10(b) should
be read "flexibly, not technically and restrictively." Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). This mandate has served to bring novel and atypical acts of
fraud, previously excluded by the courts, within the scope of § 10(b). Id. at 10-12. See A.T.
Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1967) (suit by broker alleging fraud on
part of customers who actually purchased ordered stock only if market conditions remained
favorable is cognizable under § 10(b)). However, the Court in Bankers Life also stated its view
that "Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than
internal corporate mismanagement." 401 U.S. at 12.
"See generally I A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.7 (Supp. 1972-73) [hereinaf-
ter cited as BROMBERG]; Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Fed-
eral Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1969).
" See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971)
(fraud under § 10(b) recognized by Supreme Court where defendants misappropriated corpo-
rate assets, using them to finance. purchase of corporation's stock). In Bankers Life, however,
the Court, consistent with the narrow view of § 10(b), stated that transactions constituting no
more than internal mismanagement are not within the scope of §10(b). Id. at 12. See generally
Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV.
L. }ZEN, 1007, 1015.20 (1973).
91
 "Control" is a term of art in securities law. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(f) (1977). See also
1 Loss, supra note 87, at 770, 778-79; Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule I0b-5
Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1007, 1034-36 (1973).
"See, e.g., DEL. Coot tit. 8, §§ 141, 161, 170, 253 (1975). The board of directors may
generally issue stock, redeem convertible stock, pay dividends, and effect a short-form merger
without first seeking shareholder approval. Id. Even where shareholder approval is required,
the outcome is often predetermined since the controlling stockholders necessarily hold at least
a majority of the voting stock. See, e.g., Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 716 (2d Cir. 1972)
(shareholder approval of long-form merger unaffected by minority vote); Swanson v. Ameri-
can Consumer Indus., Inc. 415 F.2d 1326, 1331 (7th Cir. 1969) (minority stockholders hold-
ing 13% of voting stock unable to affect outcome of vote on proposed exchange offer). As a
result of a majority's power to effect a given transaction, proof of causation under § 10(b) has
been relaxed from that required by traditional theory , so that plaintiffs need only establish that
the alleged misrepresentations or omissions caused them economic harm. See Schlick v.
Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-83 (2d Cir. 1974); Swanson, 415 F.2d at 1331-32.
Further, reliance on the alleged deception need not be proved in a case challenging a short-
form merger under § 10(b). Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
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approval may not involve a breach of an actual duty to disclose, it is well
recognized that transactions involving an abuse of corporate control can
"deceive" the minority stockholders." Thus, when a corporation issues
stock," redeems its convertible debentures," engages in a . short-form
merger97 or any other securities transaction, and plaintiffs allege that the
controlling stockholder has acted in a manner which has deceived the
stockholders as to the true facts of the transaction, section 10(b) extends to
the complaint and examines the manner in which the transaction was car-
ried out to insure that the rights of the minority stockholders are fully pro-
tected."
To the extent that section 10(b) acts to remedy harm suffered from a
manipulative or deceptive intracorporate securities transaction, it insures
that the terms of the transaction are fair to the minority stockholders." Ac-
cording to the narrow view of section 10(b), fairness presumptively results
once all material information is disclosed to the parties concerned. Once
this disclosure has been made, all parties are deemed to. be on notice of
their rights and options. Thus, in an intracorporate context, section 10(b)'s
strictures are satisfied once the majority discloses all material information
respecting a securities transaction — including a short-form merger — to
the minority stockholders.'°° However, if it is shown that the majority
stockholders exercised their controlling influence to effectuate a transaction
without fully disclosing pertinent information to the minority stockholders,
a cognizable section 10(b) claim is established."' Consequently, under the
narrow view of section 10(b), alleging fundamental unfairness of the result
stemming from an intracorporate transaction, without more, is insufficient
to establish a claim under section 10(b) since inequities may obtain from
sources other than nondisclosure.'"
B. The Broad Interpretation of Section 10(b)
The strict view adopted by the Santa Fe Court in defining the scope of
section 10(b) is not, as noted above, the exclusive approach adopted by
courts in resolving the issue of the scope of section 10(b). The alternative
view of section 10(b), adopted by the Second Circuit in Santa Fe,'° 3 may be
D4 See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2(1 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 867, 869 (3d Cir. 1968). See also Jacobs,
The Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Mismanagement, 59
CoRNEt.t.L. REv. '27, 57.61 (1973). •
"See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 217-18 (2d. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969),
"See Dutchman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 724-25, 736 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc).
97 See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 630-31 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 372 (D. Del. 1965).
" Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 219-20; Drachman, 453 F.2d at 737; Vine, 374 F.2d at 637;
Voege, 241 F. Supp at 372, 376.
" See 4 BROMBERG, supra note 90, § 12.5, at 275-76.
"' Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478; Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 720 (2d Cir. 1972).
101 See cases cited in note 98 supra.
1 " Most obviously, arguably inequitable results may obtain due to unequal capital in the
market or unequal voting strength in the corporation, as well as unfavorable market condi-
tions. Further, even if the Second Circuits "business purpose" test were adopted, see text at
note 41 supra, it is not clear whether satisfying that standard would actually remove any in-
equity inhering in a merger or merely legitimatize such results.
105 533 F.2d 1283.
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termed the "remedial" or "broad" view. This remedial approach considers
the primary purpose of section 10(b) to be that of achieving overall fairness
in securities transactions by protecting innocent investors from overreach-
ing by persons possessing superior information or control of the corporate
process.'" Under this broad view of section 10(b), all complaints alleging
that innocent investors have been harmed by a securities transaction in
which they have no control over the outcome are cognizable. Thus, while
the concept of fairness in securities law is defined under the strict view
solely in terms of equal access to material information, under the remedial
view of fairness, section 10(b) also encompasses those complaints seeking
relief from inequitable acts accomplished through means other than non-
disclosure or misrepresentation.'" This latter type of unfairness occurs in
the market as a consequence of unequal bargaining power resulting from
unequal capital, and, in the intracorporate context, is due to unequal con-
trol resulting from the corporate system of majority rule. Advocates of the
remedial . view maintain that federal securities law should be utilized to
mitigate the harm resulting from unequal capital and control in the context
of freeze out mergers.'"
Adherents of this broad view find support for their position in the
legislative purpose announced in the Securities Exchange Act to provide
uniform federal relief for all injuries suffered in connection with a se-
curities transaction.'" Reflecting this broad purpose of section 10(b) to rem-
edy injuries, the section was described in the legislative history as a
"catch-all" provision,'" and as one intended to encompass claims arising
from all inequitable securities transactions effectuated for no justifiable
purpose.'" Thus, the broad approach defines the scope of section 10(b)
primarily in terms of whether the plaintiff has incurred injury in connec-
tion with a securities transaction and, in the context of short-form mergers,
whether the resulting inequity was justified by the existence of a valid pur-
pose for effecting the transaction."° Accordingly, while the existence of
full disclosure is often relevant in determining the lawfulness of a given
104 Santa Fe, 533 F.2d at 1287. See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); 1 Loss, supra note 87, at 130-31; S. REP. No, 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934).
'Santa Fe, 533 F.2d at 1287.
' 0tl See, e.g. O'Neal & Janke, supra note 3, at 327-30; Note, Going Private: An Analysis of
Federal and State Remedies, 44 FORMIANI L RES', 796, 816 (1976); Comment,•The Second Circuit
Adopts a Business Purpose Test for Going Private: Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa
Fe Industries, Inc., 64 CoLuu. L. REV. 1184, 1196.97 (1976); Address by A.A. Sooner, Jr„ Com-
missioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, Law Advisory Council Lecture, Notre Dame
Law School, South Bend, Indiana, reprinted in [1974-75 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC L. REP.
(CCH) 4 80,010.
107
 Drachmae v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 728-29 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds on rehear-
ing en bane, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972). Support for the remedial view of § 10(b) is also
claimed from the purpose of Securities Exchange Act to maintain public confidence in the se-
curities market. See Santa Fe, 533 F.2d at 1296 (Mansfield, J., concurring); 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)
(1970); Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86
HARV. L. RES'. 1007, 1046 (1973).
"'Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. '115 (1934) (Remarks of Thomas G. Corcoran, Stock Exchange
Regulation). So, also, 1 BkOMBERG,supra note 90, § 2.2(332), at 22.4 (Stipp. 1970-71).
1° ' See S. REP. No, 792, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1934).
"° Santa Fe, 533 F.2d at 1291.
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transaction, under the remedial approach it is not always the "crucial in- .
qui ry,"" 1 nor is it determinative of whether section 10(b) has been violated.
This concern for protecting investors, furthered by the remedial approach
to section 10(b), thus supports the view that if a securities transaction is al-
leged to have caused inequitible results without simultaneously having
served a justifiable purpose, the claim is cognizable under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5.
The so-called "new fraud" theory of section 10(b) liability," 2 first an-
nounced by the Second Circuit in Schoenbaum v. Firstbroolt," 3 is premised on
the remedial approach to interpreting the scope of section 10(b)." 4 Under
the "new fraud" theory, a claim that the majority stockholders exercised a
controlling influence over the corporation to the detriment of the minority
stockholders is cognizable under section 10(b) even without actual decep-
tion. Therefore, unlike the narrow view of section 10(b), the theory of
"new fraud" is not limited in scope to fraud accomplished through tra-
ditional acts of manipulation or deception. Because fraud may often be ac-
complished in intracorporate transactions even in the absence of actual de-
ception"' by virtue of the majority stockholders' control of the corporate
processes, the new fraud" theory focuses on fraud accomplished through
improper self-dealing by a corporate majority which results in economic
harm to the corporation and its minority stockholders."s
The remedial view's focus on acts of improper self-dealing, rather
than acts of nondisclosure or misrepresentation, as the basis of section
10(b) liability in the context of intracorporate securities transactions stems
from the absence of arms length bargaining in that context. There is no
arms length bargaining in an intracorporate transaction because the con-
trolling stockholders' personal interests in the transaction tend to be ad-
verse to those of the minority stockholders and of the corporation itself, to
"I Id. at 1292. But see Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 720 (2d Cir. 1972) (in context of
long-form merger, full disclosure is the only federal interest under § 10(b)).
an Popkin v. Bishop ; 464 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1972). See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), reit denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Drachman v.
Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970);
Rekant v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968).
13 405 F.2c1 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). Schoenbaum
was a derivative suit by the minority stockholders of Banff Oil, Ltd., claiming that Banff was
defrauded by Aquitane Co. of Canada Ltd., Banff's controlling stockholder, when it caused
Banff to issue stock to itself just prior to the announcement or a major oil discovery which
greatly increased the value of Banff stuck. 405 F.2d 200, 204-06. On argument before a three
judge panel the district court's award of summary judgment to the defendants was affirmed
because the panel found that all of Banff's directors were informed of the terms of the trans-
action and !hat this knowledge had .to be imputed to the corporation. Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2c1 200, 204, 211, 214 (2d Cir, 1968). Sitting en bane, however, the Second
Circuit reversed the decision on the "new fraud" theory of liability under rule 10b-5. 405 F.2d
215, 219-20, The court reached an alternative holding that the minority stockholders of Banff
were deceived by the sale. Id. at 220.
" 1 See note 66 supra.
" 5 "Actual deception" here refers to both nondisclosure and misrepresentation of mate-
rial information.
See generally Bloomeniba1, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum; The Exchange Act and Self'
Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.j. 332, 332-37 (1969); Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The
"New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REV. 1 103 (1969).
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whom they owe a fiduciary duty of fair dealing.'" Since the controlling
stockholders may be empowered to effect a securities transaction without
prior disclosure of the transaction's terms to the minority stockholders,
minority stockholders may be injured even though there is no act of non-
disclosure or misrepresentation which, according to the narrow view of sec-
tion I0(b), is sufficient upon which to premise section 10(b) liability. Con-
sequently, proponents of the "new fraud" theory advocate utilizing section
10(b) to determine whether the majority stockholders' exercise of control
over the corporation has resulted in harm to the minority stockholders
rather than limiting the scope of section 10(b) to inquiring whether an
actual duty to disclose has been breached.'"
The remedial view of section 10(b), adopted by the Second Circuit in
Santa Fe, seeks to effect the broad purpose underlying the Securities Ex-
change Act of protecting investors from injuries incurred in securities
transactions. Proponents of this remedial view advocate expanding the
scope of section 10(b) to encompass complaints arising from intracorporate
securities transactions effectuated by the controlling stockholders in.the ab-
sence of actual deception. According to the remedial view, section 10(b)
would thus encompass claims of breach of fiduciary duty, claims which tra-
ditionally are the province of state law. Consequently, the broad view of
section 10(b) provides for a greater spectrum of federal involvement in
state corporate law than is sanctioned by the narrow view which would limit
section 10(b) relief to intracorporate transactions involving manipulation or
deception.
C. The Two Views of Section 10(b) as Applied in Santa Fe
The two views of section 10(b), the narrow view of the Supreme
Court and the broad view of the Second Circuit, differ most markedly in
the context-of intracorporate securities transactions where allegedly fraudu-
lent acts are committed in the absence of actual deception or manipulation.
Whereas under the broad view, section 10(b) may properly extend to issues
of overall fairness arising from the majority stockholders' exercise of cor-
porate control, under the narrow view, section 10(b) is deemed concerned
only with redressing unfairness resulting from acts of manipulation or de-
ception. This difference between the two views of section 10(b) is further
highlighted in cases such as Santa Fe where a plaintiff alleges that the
majority stockholders' actions constituted a breach of fiduciary duty not
recognized as such under state corporate fiduciary law." 9 Such a claim re-
"'These transactions have been labelled "conflict transactions." 1 Bitomeexc,supra note
90, *4.7(000)(1) (Supp. 1972-73). An adverse personal interest is clearly present in a freeze-
out merger where the majority stockholders stand to realize higher earnings per share, higher
book value per share, and larger proportional control for their holdings at the expense of the
minority stockholders who are cashed out at depressed prices. 4 BROMBERG, supra note 90,
§ 4.7 at 400.11.
"" See O'Neal & Janke, supra note 3, at 342; Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in
Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 IJARV. L REV. 1007, 1040 (1973); Comment,
Schoenhaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REA%
1103, 1113-14 (1969).
" 9 Snuffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1962)
(in the absence of actual fraud, appraisal is the exclusive remedy of frozen out minority stock-
holders). The holding in Stauffer was undercut by the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1977, in
Kemp v. Angel, 381 A,2d 241, where the court granted a preliminary injunction against a
954
CASENOTES
quires federal courts to determine the proper interface between federal
and state regulation of corporate affairs. More particularly, the issue be-
comes whether section 10(b) creates any federal fiduciary duties or whether
it relies solely upon the fiduciary duties existing in the particular state in-
volved.' 2° With respect to this fiduciary duty issue, the narrow interpreta-
tion of section 10(b) suggests that the imposition of federal fiduciary duties
is improper, since section 10(b) is concerned solely with issues of nondisclo-
sure and misrepresentation. Conversely, the broad view of section 10(b)
suggests that, on occasion, imposing federal fiduciary duties upon parties to
securities transactions will be proper since state fiduciary laws may in-
adequately protect minority stockholders from inequitable results in securi-
ties transactions.
The Second Circuit, adopting a, broad view of section 10(h), consid-
ered the short-form merger effectuated by Santa Fe to eliminate the minor-
ity stockholders of Kirby Lumber Company an appropriate instance for the
recognition of federal fiduciary duties under section I0(b). The recognition
of federal fiduciary duties was appropriate in Santa Fe, according to the
Second Circuit, because Delaware law provided inadequate protection to
minority stockholders frozen out in a short-form merger. In this regard,
the court impliedly recognized an interest on the part of the minority
stockholders in retaining ownership of their stock at least until such time as
the majority stockholders could justify a forced divestiture by referring to a
valid business purpose."' The Second Circuit thus viewed Delaware law as
inadequate because the merger statute provided minority stockholders with
no right to participate in the decision to merge. 122 Furthermore, the court
noted that under Delaware fiduciary law, minority stockholders have no
right to challenge the unfairness of being forcibly divested of their holdings
by a merger allegedly undertaken for the sole purpose of furthering the
interests of the majority stockholders.' 23 Rather, the Santa Fe plaintiffs' sole
remedy was the statutory appraisal proceeding. The Second Circuit deter-
mined that the appraisal remedy was similarly inadequate to protect the
interests of the minority stockholders since appraisal is concerned only with
assessing the fair market value of the stock at the time of the merger rather
than with the motive therefore."' Due to the inadequate protection af-
proposed short-form merger and ordered a trial on the question of the overall fairness to the
minority stockholders. Id. at 245.
12" This question has seldom been expressly addressed by commentators or the courts.
However, it has been suggested that federal courts lack the power to create fiduciary stan-
dards under § 10(b). Borden, supra note 3 at 1037-39. See also Santa Fe, 533 F.2d at 1304-07
(Moore, J., dissenting); Diamond v. Oreamuno,24 N.Y.2d 494, 503-04, 248 N.E2d 910, 915,
301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 85 (N.Y. App. 1969) ("the primary source of law in this area ever remains
that of the state which created the corporation").
"I 533 F.2d at 1289-92. This approach appears to be a modification of a strict "vested
interest" rationale, which would vest stockholders with a right to veto virtually all transactions.
See Borden, supra note 3, at 1020-21.
122 533 F.2d at 1289. See DU. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1975).
"'Id. at 1289, 1291-92. Subsequent. to the decision in Santa Fe, the Delaware courts
have ruled that minority stockholders frozen out in a going private merger may challenge the
overall fairness of the transaction. Singer v, Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 98(1 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1977) (long-form merger); Tattier v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1125
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1977) (long-form merger); Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241, 245 (Del. Ch. 1977)
(short-form merger).
1 " Id. at 1289. See Du. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (1975).
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forded to the minority stockholders by Delaware law, the Second Circuit
found it both necessary and appropriate to utilize section 10(b) as a forum
for redressing any injuries incurred in a short-form merger.
While the Second Circuit's approach may appear reasonable, it is
submitted that the strict approach adopted by the Supreme Court provides
both the most appropriate analytical framework for interpreting the scope
of section 10(6) and the proper result in determining that federal fiduciary
standards should not be imposed on short-form mergers under section
10(b). This conclusion is supported by several considerations.
First, the strict view of section 10(b) adopted by the Supreme Court is
supported by the language of the statute which, in.every section 10(b) case,
is "the appropriate starting point."'" Reference to the language of section
10(b) reveals that the section is directed at eliminating fraud in connection
with securities transactions perpetrated by manipulation of stock prices or
deception of parties through nondisclosue or misrepresentation of material
information.'" While the remedial purpose of section 10(b), to protect in-
vestors, militates in favor of a broad reading of this language,'" this pur-
pose nevertheless fails to justify recognizing a complaint alleging conduct
not within the scope of illegality defined in section 10(b). Similarly, the lan-
guage of rule 10b-5 must be read in conjunction with that of section 10(b)
under which it is promulgated, and rule lOb-5 cannot independently ren-
der illegal conduct not proscribed by section 10(6). 128 Accordingly, it ap-
pears that the Supreme Court was correct in refusing to recognize a com-
plaint under section 10(b) in the absence of allegations of manipulation or
deception.'"
The second consideration supporting the determination in Santa Fe,
that federal courts should not judicially create fiduciary duties under sec-
tion 10(b) absent allegations of manipulation or deception, is the lack of
support for this development in the legislative history of the Securities Ex-
change Act. It appears from the legislative history that the statute was in-
tended primarily to eliminate the wide spread abuses in the securities mar-
ket which resulted in the market crash of 1929.' 3° The prohibition of man-
ipulative and deceptive acts in section 10(b) has been correctly extended
beyond the market to intracorporate transactions tainted with comparable
abuses of inside information and control. This extension has been fully
consistent with the statute's goal of insuring a climate of fair dealing in se-
curities."' This goal of fairness, presumably achieved through full disclo-
sure of material information, does not, however, sanction the utilization of
'" 430 U.S. at 472, quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976),
quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concur-
ring).
' 25
 For text of § 10(b) see note 8 supra.
127
 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971):
128 430 U.S. at 472-73, quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14
(1976).
129 See 89 Hato:. L. REV. 1917, 1926 (1976), stating that no appellate decision before
that of the Second Circuit in Santa Fe and Marshal v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2c1
Cir.), vacated and remanded for a determination of mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976), had permitted a
claim under § 10(b) without some element of nondisclosure or misrepresentation.
'" See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970). See also Letter of President Roosevelt to Congress (March
29, 1933), S. REP. No, 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1.2 (1933).
" 1 " See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 201 (1962).
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section 10(b) by the federal courts as a remedy for the allegedly unfair re-
sults of a securities transaction untainted by manipulation or deception.
The third consideration supporting the Supreme Court's decision in
Santa Fe is the opinion's proper rejection of the "new fraud" cases as sup-
port for the plaintiffs' claim and the Second Circuit's decision. Although
the "new fraud" theory has not been articulated by the courts in terms of
manipulation or deception, 132 it is nevertheless premised on a finding that
the minority stockholders were at least constructively deceived by the self-
serving actions of the controlling stockholders.'" So understood, the "new
fraud" theory is merely an adaptation'of the traditional deception theory
particularly suited to analyzing intracorporate securities transactions, rather
than a formula for creating independent federal duties of fairness under
section 10(13).' 34 Although there may exist no cogent reason for abandoning
the vocabulary of the "new fraud" theory in favor of the traditional lan-
guage of deception and manipulation, it does not appear that the two
theories are themselves at odds. Accordingly, it appears that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the "new fraud" cases was correct and that the
Second Circuit employed an overly broad interpretation of the "new fraud"
theory in determining that a complaint, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty
not recognized as such by state law was within the scope of section 10(b).
The interface between federal and state regulation of corporate af-
fairs is a fourth consideration militating against the creation of federal
fiduciary duties under section 10(b) unrelated to eliminating manipulation
and deception from securities transactions. As recognized by the Supreme
Court in Cort v. Ash, 13r' corporations are, in the first instance, creatures of
132 The "new fraud" theory defines a § 10(b) violation as the exercise of a controlling
influence over a corporation by the majority stockholders to the detriment of the minority
stockholders. See, e.g., Shell V. Hensley, 430 F.2d 818, 825-26 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1968) (en balm:), cent. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969);
Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968).
133 See Jacobs, The Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule IOW in the Regulation of Corporate
Mismanagement, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 27, 52-59 (1973); Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in
Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. 1007, 1032-36 (1973); Comment,
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook; The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. Riw.
1103, 1113-14, 1117-19 (1969).
t" Prior to Santa Fe, several lower federal courts rejected claims that 10(b) imposes
federal duties of fairness on majority stockholders in the going private context. See
Kauffman]] v. Lawrence. 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), alld per ruriam, 514 F.2d 283 (2d
Cir. 1975), where the court stated:
ITJhere is nothing invalid per se in a corporate effort to free itself from federal
regulations, provided the means and the methods used to effectuate that objec-
tive arc allowable under the law. Nor has the federal securities law placed
profit-making or shrewd business tactics designed to benefit insiders, without
more, beyond the pale. 'Fhose laws ... arc satisfied if a full and fair disclosure is
made, so that the decision of the holders , of WRG stock to accept or refuse the
exchange offer can be said to have been freely based upon adequate information.
A public company going "private may indeed raise serious questions con-
cerning protection of the public interest. There is, however, no foundation on
the record before me from which the ramifications of that interest within the
reach of the federal securities laws might conceivably be explored.
Id. at 17. See also Dreiv v. Music Makers Group, inc.. [1973-74 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CM) § 94,406. at 95,410 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (merger cannot be challenged under § 10(b)
on ground of unfairness alone). But see Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754, 756-57 (D.
Utah 1974) (freeze out merger undertaken for no valid business purpose violates § 10(b)).
"5 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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state law.'" Given this fundamental relationship between corporate.
fiduciary duties and state law, it is appropriate, in the absence of express
federal law to the contrary, to defer to state law for resolution of issues of
overall fairness in securities transactions. As noted above, section 10(b) does
not expressly govern issues of overall fairness in short-form mergers. Dela-
ware law, on the other hand, expressly provides for the resolution of claims
arising from such transactions by means of the statutory appraisal proceed-
ing. The Santa Fe Court was thus correct in refusing to override Delaware
law on this issue of fairness and in relegating the plaintiffs to their state law
remedies.
A final consideration supporting the Santa Fe Court's decision is that
even if federal standards are found necessary in this context,'" section
10(b) does not provide the principles appropriate for this determination.
The federal regulation of going private transactions should be effected, if
at all, by uniform standards promulgated by Congress or by the Securities
Exchange Commission. Piecemeal judicial determinations of fiduciary stan-
dards for governing such transactions under the framework of the valid
business purpose requirement do not adequately serve the interests of the
respective parties. Majority stockholders desiring to take their corporation
private have a legitimate interest in having their conduct governed by read-
ily ascertainable requirements. Judicial determinations of the rights and
duties of the parties to such transactions, in the absence of established reg-
ulations, do not serve this interest but rather impose unnecessary uncer-
tainty of result on majority stockholders. Similarly, minority stockholders
frozen out in a going private transaction have an interest in being able to
exercise intelligently their rights arising from divestiture of their holdings.
Imposing such uncertainties on the parties through judicial determinations
of fairness under section 10 (b) is thus inconsistent with the purpose of the
Securities Exchange Act to provide a uniform system of regulation where
predictability of result is achieved with a minimum of interference with the
effective functioning of business affairs.'"'
CONCLUSION
Significantly different approaches to defining the scope of section
10(b) were utilized by the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court in Santa
Fe in determining whether a claim of breach of fiduciary duty by a majority
stockholder in the context of a short-form merger is cognizable under sec-
tion 10(b). The Second Circuit adopted a broad view of section 10(b) and
read the language and purpose of that section expansively so as to bring
within its terms a claim alleging merely unfairness of result in a securities
transaction. Conversely, the Supreme Court's narrow approach to deter-
mining the scope of federal relief available under section 10(b) limited re-
lief to those complaints alleging manipulation or deception in connection
"0 Id. at 84.
1 " See 430 U.S. at 479-80. Federal regulation of going private transactions has been ad-
vocated by the SEC and is articulated in propdsed rule 13e-3. 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
I I 23,703A, 23,706. Similarly, Professor Cary has urged that a federal fiduciary code be
enacted by Congress. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.
J. 663, 700 (1974).
"ll See Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (en bane).
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with a securities transaction. A careful analysis of the statutory language of
section 10(b), its legislative history, and the interface between state and fed-
eral regulation of corporate affairs with respect to issues of overall fairness
reveals that the Santa Fe Court's narrow view of section 10(13) was analyti-
cally correct. This narrow view of the scope of section 10(b) was properly
utilized in Santa Fe by the Court in its ruling that claims of unfairness and
breach of fiduciary duty absent allegations of manipulation or deception
are not cognizable under section 10(b).
MARGUERITE A. CONAN
Constitutionally Protected Notions of Family: Moore v. City of East
Cleveland'--In 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore resided in her East Cleveland home
with her son, Dale Moore, Sr., and two grandsons, Dale Moore, Jr. and
John Moore, Jr. The two boys were first cousins, John being the son of
Mrs. Moore's other son, John Moore, Sr.' East Cleveland had a zoning or-
dinance which limited residence in any single dwelling unit to a single fam-
ily. 3 This ordinance was unusual in that it defined the term "family" so as
to include only a few categories of related individuals. Cohabitation by in-
dividuals related as first cousins was not one of these permitted categories,
and consequently, the Moore household fell outside the ordinance's defini-
tion of a single family. 4
Mrs. Moore was convicted of violating the zoning ordinance in the
East: Cleveland Municipal Court,"' and her subsequent appeals to the Court
of Appeals of' Ohio" and the Supreme Court of Ohio' were unsuccessful.
' 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
2 Id. at 496-97.
3 Cm OF EAST CLEVELAND, HOUSING CODE § 1341.08 (1966). Section 1341.08 provides:
"Family" means a number of individuals related to the nominal head of
the household or to the spouse of the nominal head of the household living as a
single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited to the following:
(a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household.
(b) Unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or of the
spouse of the•nominal head of the household, provided, however, that such un-
married children have no children residing with them.
(c) Father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the
spouse of the nominal head of the household.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family may
include not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nomi-
nal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the house-
hold and the spouse and dependent children of such dependent child. For the
purpose of this subsection, a dependent person is one who has more than fifty
percent of his total support furnished for him by the nominal head of the
household and the spouse of the nominal head of the household.
(e) A family may consist of one individual.
Section 1341.08 excludes many other relational combinations from the ambit of the
term "family." For example, households consisting of two brothers or an aunt residing with
her niece, cannot occupy a single dwelling unit.
3
 431 U.S. at 497. Upon Mrs. Moore's refusal to remove John Moore, Jr. from her
household, the city filed a criminal complaint, charging her with violation of the zoning ordi-
nance. Mrs. Moore stipulated to the facts underlying the complaint and was fined twenty-five
dollars and sentenced to five days in prison, Id.
City of East Cleveland v. Moore, No. 33888 (Ct. App. Ohio July 18, 1975).
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, No. 75-896 (Ohio Nov. 28, 1975).
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